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1. Introduction 
 The contemporary debate in philosophy of music about the 
ontological status of musical works seems sometimes to have little to do 
with actual musical practices and experiences. As Lydia Goehr observed 
(1992) the danger is here very high that the competing theories remain 
unrelated to the actual practices they should explain. It is difficult to 
understand why elaborating complex conceptual systems for answering 
the ontological question “What is a musical work?” is worthwhile, if, aside 
from discrepancies between scores, which may be often rectified through 
philological examination, the identification of a certain performance as 
performance of a certain work is normally not problematic in the central 
case. Better and more interesting is to search for aesthetic reasons that 
can explain why, to which degree, regarding which aspects (and so on), a 
certain performance is good, bad, exciting, innovative, moving, insipid 
and so on, and to be preferred to other performances of the same work. 
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Some ontologists insist that this is not the point at issue. Musical 
ontology, they argue, is not in the service of artistic criticism or of 
aesthetic practices. It is a philosophical matter that is to be pursued per 
se. I do not deny that this can be done. Moreover one could think that 
evaluative questions could be satisfactorily answered only with the 
support of a convincing ontology. Still, it remains unclear how a 
convincing ontological back-drop can perspicuously explain evaluative 
questions, when ontology is not linked to the concrete historical musical 
practices in which its concepts (work, song, track, performance, etc.) 
really arise and work (cf. Ridley 2003: 210). 
Considerations of this kind induced scholars to reflect on the 
methodology of musical ontology (cf. Kania 2008a and Stecker 2009) as 
well as to examine the relation i) between musical ontology and musical 
practices, sometimes grounding the first on the second (Davies 2009), ii) 
between fundamental musical ontology and more specific musical 
ontologies such as rock- or jazz ontologies, maybe doubting about the 
usefulness of both (Brown 2011), and iii) between ontology and 
aesthetics of music, sometimes treating the first as an “idle distraction” 
from the second (Ridley 2003: 220) or even as a “pseudo-problem” 
(Young 2011). 
I do not consider musical ontology as a pseudo-problem per se. Still, I 
favour the view that, in order not to become entirely divorced from the 
reality it should explain, thus reducing itself to an “idle distraction”, it 
should be tied to real aesthetic and artistic practices. Yet, this seems to 
beg the question, because in an ontological inquiry one of the points at 
issue is precisely which are the real aesthetic and artistic practices. 
Anyway, I think that as a starting point, it is not problematic to accept the 
view that in order to be tied to real aesthetic and artistic practices a 
musical ontology should be acceptable from the perspective of those who 
make and listen to music and not reduce itself to hair-splitting analysis of 
mere conceptual philosophical artefacts. 
The main reason for my suspicions regarding a large part of 
contemporary musical ontology is precisely that it regards music in terms 
which are at odds with musical aesthetic and artistic practices and with 
the basic ordinary intuition that music is a performance art with takes 
different shapes and uses different techniques and materials, but it is 
mainly an activity of producing sounds to be heard. A large part of the 
ontology of music is formalistic and objectivistic: it regards musical 
works (MWs) as kinds of objects, whether abstract or concrete, which are 
to be understood as formal structures. The problem with this view is that 
this is not enough to explain our musical experience: music is not only 
heard and understood in terms of objects, facts or structures, but also in 
terms of events, activities or processes, that take place or occur here and 
now. 
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In this paper I will offer a programmatic hint of how musical ontology 
can accommodate this ordinary intuition. In order to do that, I will take 
into consideration the practice of musical improvisation. The focus on 
improvisation, instead of on works, is useful to reshape the discourse of 
musical ontology in non-formalistic and non-objectivist terms. Since 
music entered the realm of the fine arts, around the end of 18th-century, 
improvisation was thrown out of music, as something that, due to the 
absence of planning and discipline, could not be reconciled with the 
discipline of art (Nettl 1998: 7). For this reason improvisation has been 
neglected in musicology as well as in philosophy of music. Although, to 
tell the truth, in the last years improvisation is regaining attention in 
philosophy of music and in musicology, the models that contemporary 
musical ontology builds to explain what a musical work (MW) is make 
understanding the significance of improvisation for music very difficult: 
improvisation does not fit well for the construction of an ontology of 
MWs as structural objects. 
Yet, those models, whether or not metaphysically mistaken, are 
highly counterintuitive and do not capture the musical experience of the 
common listener. Hence I suggest that we regard the link between 
musical ontology and improvisation the other way round. Instead of 
understanding musical improvisation on the basis of the contemporary 
debate on the MWs’ ontology, the strategy I will suggest here is to 
reshape musical ontology in light of a philosophical exploration of 
improvisation. Still, a preliminary caveat must be given to avoid 
unnecessary misunderstandings. I am not committed to identifying music 
with improvisation: I will rather argue that improvisation exemplifies 
important facets of music that musical ontology should not disregard. 
I will proceed as follows. In section 2. I present a simplified account 
of the main theories of musical ontology on the market and of some 
objections commonly raised against them. In section 3. I criticise the way 
formalistic ontology explains improvisation. In the sections 4. and 5. the 
main argument for considering musical improvisation as central for 
music ontology is prepared and outlined in a programmatic way. 
2. Musical Ontology. A Sketch of the Theories 
Three main views in contemporary musical ontology are the 
following ones: 
a) The ‘Platonist’ or ‘Structuralist’ concept of MWs as types. 
b) The ‘Nominalist’ view of MWs as classes of performances that are 
compliant with a score. 
c) The ‘Continuist’ theory of MSs as objects with different temporal 
parts. 
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a) According to the Platonist view, MWs must be distinguished from 
their performances, because we can assign a set of properties to the work 
and a different set of properties to the performance of the work. MWs are 
ideal types and do not exist in our spatiotemporal world like their tokens, 
that is, performances, do. Hence MWs, as types, are discovered, not 
created, by composers (cf. Wolterstorff 1975, Kivy 2002 and 2004, Dodd 
2007). 
b) According to Nominalism, all that exists are particulars. In music 
only the concrete performances exist. Hence, as famously argued by 
Nelson Goodman (1976), music must be conceived in terms of 
compliance between a certain performance and the characters in a 
notational system, the score. MW is the class of the performances that 
comply with the score. So scores are the central elements of this theory. 
c) According to Continuism, MWs are concrete temporal objects (cf. 
Rohrbaugh 2003). Continuists argue that if MWs were abstract types they 
could not enter into causal relations; hence we could not even refer to 
them. Nonetheless MWs are not compliance classes between 
performances and scores, because we want to refer to works without 
referring to their performances. MWs are rather historical temporally 
and modally flexible objects that come to be, can change and can 
disappear. They have temporal parts–their performances–which are their 
occurrences and which can be correct or incorrect. Hence, the criteria of 
identity of MWs are normative and depend on the practice in which each 
work takes its place. The reason why we are used to thinking about MWs 
as more or less unchangeable entities is that in our cultural practice MWs 
are often scored and the score ‘freezes’, as it were, possible temporal 
transformations.1 
Each of these theories has been criticised for different reasons. 
a) I will mention three objections against Platonism. 
x) Platonism goes against our intuition that MWs are created, not 
discovered by the composer. It hardly explains how we can consider a 
MW – say Mahler's Tenth Symphony – as unfinished. It does not account 
for modal flexibility, that is, for the common view that MWs could have 
been somewhat different from how they actually are (see Rohrbaugh 
2003 and Benson 2003: 60). 
y) Platonism generally considers structures as the essential elements 
of MWs, because only structures can be discovered. This is true for 
certain musical parameters, but is certainly not generally true. Non-
structural features (duration, phrasing, rhythm, timbre, instrumentation, 
dynamics etc.), are the most important elements in certain musical 
                                                                   
1 ‘Perdurantism’, a theory similar to ‘Continuism’, cannot be considered here, due to 
space reasons. Cf. Caplan and Matheson 2006. 
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practices (cf. Trivedi 2002: 78). For example, you could not ever think 
about jazz in purely structural terms, i.e. abstracting its structures from 
the particular tone colours of the instruments played by each singular 
musician, the dynamics, the swing, etc. Moreover, different kinds of music 
differ from each other also as to which kinds of structures are the most 
aesthetically and artistically relevant in every case. In a symphony the 
appreciation of the work requires understanding the ‘big’ structures of its 
movements as well as its global harmonic development. In a jazz 
standard the structure of the harmonic chord progression can be very 
simple and banal, yet this does not imply that the piece is simple and 
banal: in this case the melodic and rhythmic structures of the solos can be 
the relevant thing. 
z) According to Platonism, if two different persons compose the same 
tonal structure, they compose the same MW (Davies 2009: 160). Yet: 
z.1) There can be MWs that share the same sound sequences, but are 
nonetheless different MWs for the different properties are to be 
considered for their appreciation.2 
z.2) The idea that the historical context of the musical practice in 
which the work is composed and performed as well the instruments that 
should be played for producing the sounds of a certain MW are not 
relevant to determine the musical object seems at odds with our ordinary 
understanding of music. As argued by Stefano Predelli, “even for a 
particular work, the decision about what kind of properties are demanded 
from its correct performances may depend not only on the sort of object 
the work is, but also ‘on the context’” (Predelli 2011: 281). In other words, 
“it would be a mistake to suppose that constraints [for performance-
correctness] are embedded within the work’s very nature” (Predelli 
2006: 160), because standards of correctness shift accordingly to 
aesthetic, cultural, and technical changes in musical practices (Predelli 
1995: 346-7).3 
                                                                   
2 I thank Jerrold Levinson for helpful comments on this point. 
3 If I accept this point of Predelli’s criticism against musical Platonism, I think, against 
his position, that this move does not imply a strong separation between ontology and 
aesthetics; quite on the contrary, it shows that a better assessment of the link between 
aesthetics and ontology is required. I will briefly discuss this point in the last part of 
this paper. Cf. also Predelli 2001. Levinson (1990) proposed a correction of the 
Platonist view, in order to solve these problems. On the basis of the implicit view that 
the demands of art “trump the demands of metaphysics” (Kania 2008b: 429), he 
argued that MWs are initiated-types that are not there before the composer invents 
them. Moreover he argued that works are not only sound-structures, but indicated-
sound-structures, that specify the instruments to be played. Dodd (2000) criticized 
this view, on the ground that types are eternal, and so indicated-types, if they are 
types, cannot be atemporal. Levinson (2012) now claims that, if Dodd is right, then one 
could think that initiated-types are not strictly types at all, but simply ‘generic entities’ 
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b) The main objection raised against Goodman's theory is quite 
famous. Goodman argued that “since complete compliance with the score 
is the only requirement for a genuine instance of a work, the most 
miserable performance without actual mistakes does count as such an 
instance, while the most brilliant performance with a single wrong note 
does not.” (Goodman 1976: 186). 
This is at odds with the intuition that the identification of a work by 
its performances requires us to take into considerations elements like 
speed, dynamics, tempo, etc. and that there are plenty of bad 
performances of works in which every right note and no wrong notes are 
played, as well as good or even excellent performances in which some 
notes in the score are not played, and still we have no doubt in identifying 
the performance as a performance of the work it is a performance of. 
Goodman explains that his aim is to codify a coherent ontology, not to 
adapt the ontology to our practice. Anyway, this is precisely the point at 
issue: we want a theory that explains our practice, not one that is so 
blatantly at odds with it.4 Moreover, Goodman’s reference to classes is at 
odds with his official nominalism.5 
c) Regarding Continuism, I think that it accounts better than 
Nominalism and Platonism for the performative character of music and 
its notion of MW is better tied to musical practice. Still, aside from 
technical aspects like the ones criticised by hard-Platonists (see Dodd 
2004), it conceives music in terms of objects, whereby, as I will argue 
later, music should be better primarily explained in terms of activities 
and processes. 
I will argue in favour of this claim by discussing the link between 
music ontology and improvisation. 
3. Musical Improvisation and the Type/Token Ontology
6
 
A simple definition of musical improvisation is this: an improvisation 
is a process, in which creative and performing musical activities not only 
                                                                                                                                                   
(as R. Wollheim called them). Following Kania’s terminology (2008b), I prefer to 
consider them as ‘fictions’. 
4 Descriptive, not revistionistic, metaphysics is needed (I take this terminology from 
Kania 2008b). Further objections against Goodman’s theory are raised by Wolterstorff 
(1975) and Kivy (2002). An interesting emendation of Goodman’s theory, which 
preserves Nominalism, but mitigates its paradoxical character, is given by Stefano 
Predelli (1999a and 1999b), by arguing that in order to play a MW it suffices that you 
have a serious intention to play MW, even if you make some mistake in realizing this 
intention. 
5 I thank Lee B. Brown for this precious suggestion. 
6 For a detailed account of the conceptual relationship between musical improvisation 
and the type/token ontological duality see Bertinetto 2012 (forthcoming). 
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occur at the same time, but are the one and same generative occurrence. 
Hence an improvisation is a process that unfolds while being invented: it is 
an ephemeral, temporally irreversible, and unrepeatable event. In 
musical improvisation the creativity is performative, and vice versa, the 
performance is creative (cf. Bertinetto 2011: 94-96). Improvisation is 
“une action spontanée où l’on agit de manière imprévue, en ne se bornant 
pas à une décision d’agir prise à l’avance” (Levinson 2010: 213). 
Therefore formalist musical ontologies such as Nominalism and 
Platonism are unsuitable for explaining improvisation. Goodman’s 
Nominalism is unsuitable for improvisation for the simple reason that 
improvised music cannot be conceived in terms of performances that are 
compliant with a score. For improvisations are, by definition, “making 
music without writing music” (Austin 1983: 33).7 Platonism also hardly 
explains improvisation, for the ontology of improvised music cannot be 
worked out in terms of the application of the type/token duality. This 
ontological alternative may explain the relation between a MW and its 
performances, but in an improvisation the distinction between MW and 
performance collapses. An improvisation is neither a performed MW not 
a performance of a MW, although it can be a performance on or inspired 
by a MW (or a performance thereof) and even if MWs can be invented (or 
discovered) by means of improvising. 
The type/token duality does not apply for improvisation, because, if 
we claim that a musical improvisation is a type, we should admit the 
possibility of multiple occurrences of the type; but this conflicts with the 
singularity of improvisation that, as created by being performed, is an 
unrepeatable process and its spatiotemporal conditions are part of its 
identity. Analogously, if we consider the problem the other way round, 
and conceive a bit of improvised music as a token, it is not clear what type 
improvised music should be the token of. In other words, one could 
consider a certain musical improvisational event, that took place at the A-
Trane in Berlin on January, the 4th 2012 between 22:00 and 22:15 pm as a 
token of the type “musical improvisational event at A-Trane in Berlin”, or 
of the type “improvisational event occurred on January, the 4th 2012”, or 
of the type “musical improvisational event occurred on January, the 4th 
2012 at A-Trane in Berlin”, or of the type “music improvised by Peter 
Liedermacher, Georg Schlager und Hans Sax”, or “music improvised by 
Peter Liedermacher, Georg Schlager und Hans Sax in Berlin”, or 
                                                                   
7 Obviously, I am not saying that making music without written music is always 
improvisation. Brown (1996) argues that Goodman’s distinction between allographic 
and autographic art does not accommodate improvisation. Whether an emendation 
such as Predelli’s could make Goodman’s philosophy of art suitable for improvisation 
is a question I will not pursue here for space reasons. 
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“improvisational event” or…?? In other words, it is impossible to single 
out the relevant type concerning the ontology of improvisation, although 
we can choose different possible semantic descriptions of the single event 
occurred. 
Yet Platonists are tough: therefore we have to discuss their views at 
some length. One might be tempted to explain the type/token nature of 
improvisation by considering that in musical improvisation, for example 
in jazz, musicians do not usually create ex nihilo: they use pre-composed 
and prepared elements (materials, formulas, riffs and so on). An 
improvisation v, one might argue, is the combination of those elements. 
Hence, a) v is the combination of patterns that are types, and as such, v is 
a type too; or b) v is the occurrence of a combination of those types, i.e. a 
token thereof. Unfortunately, for the Platonist, even if we grant, for the 
sake of the argument, that v is only the combination of prepared materials 
and formulas, this answer still does not work. In fact the manner, the 
order, and the time in which the prepared elements are selected and 
played is decided on the spot.8 Moreover the changing musical and 
performing context contributes to reshaping the ‘same old’ riff into 
something new. In this respect the processual character of v has to be 
considered as crucial: v must be primarily regarded not as result of a 
performing activity, but as performance in actu. Hence one should not 
abstract from v’s spatiotemporal conditions in order to explain its 
ontology, for those conditions are part of its ontological identity (an 
identity that, as activity in actu, is an on-going transformation). 
This argument also does not work with transcriptions of v.9 If you 
transcribe v, or extract a structural (melodic, rhythmic, harmonic) 
pattern from v, you change ontologically v into something else, exactly 
because, in so doing, you are abstracting from the dynamic character of v 
as activity-in-action. Those operations are often important to make v 
accessible and an object of experience aside from its situational frame, to 
document v, to make v analysable. They are very important for various 
reasons – didactic, aesthetic, artistic, commercial, etc. Still they do not 
serve the cause of Platonist ontology. Platonist ontology based on the 
type/token dichotomy as well as the Nominalist ontology based on the 
idea of compliance class are not valid for the ontology of improvisation 
stricto sensu. 
However, in the philosophical literature, the ontology of 
improvisation is subordinated to formalistic ontologies of MWs. Here I 
will discuss two of those theories. The first one was suggested by Philip 
                                                                   
8 Not to mention that often v is an interactive interplay and process between several 
musicians. 
9 I put off the implications of sound recording for another paper. 
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Alperson. In order to accommodate the singularity of improvisation with 
the type/token ontology, Alperson claims that an improvisation can be 
conceived as the unique token of a type, i.e. as a type having a single token 
(what scholars now call a 'singleton'). In this sense, he writes: “(...) 
musical improvisation seems ontologically closer to the creation of a 
wood sculpture – the unique token instance of the type – rather than to a 
conventional musical performance” (Alperson 1984: 26), which must be 
conceived, by contrast, as one of the multiple tokens of a unique type. 
Yet, this move conflicts with the most widespread ontological theory 
about types and, in order to adjust to the singularity of improvisations, 
achieves an unwanted result for formalistic and objectivist ontologies. If 
we argue that improvisations are singular tokens of singular types, aside 
from the fact that this is at odds with general metaphysics, in this way we 
are forced to accept that every musical performance – not only 
improvised performances, but even performances of musical 
compositions – is a token with its own type ‘attached’, as it were, to it: the 
type “Musical Work performed at time t in space s with players pp... etc.” 
(MWTS), an only-once-tokened-type (a singleton) that is ‘discovered’ or 
‘created’ (to decide this is not crucial here), while the music is being 
performed. This would change musical Platonism into a strange kind of 
“nominalistic Platonism” or “platonistic Nominalism”. The Platonist part 
of the theory is that the type “composed musical work” MWT is 
instantiated in the tokens that are its performances (MWts). The 
Nominalist part results from the idea of improvisation as a single token of 
an only-once-tokened-type: if we grant this view, I do not see any reason 
to reject the implication that each singular MWt would actually be the 
occurrence of its singular type (a singleton: MWTS) and MWT would be 
better understood as the class of all the MWTSs. 
This is rather at odds with our ordinary intuitions about works and 
performances and it conflicts resoundingly with Occam's Razor (“no 
entity without necessity”). On my view, if only for the sake of elegance, it 
would be better to avoid an ontology that includes entities like MWTSs. 
Yet Alperson’s ontological view of improvisation obtains only iff such an 
ontology holds true. Because this is not the case, then Alperson’s ontology 
of improvisation, in this specific regard, fails.10 
The second formalistic explanation of musical improvisation I take 
into consideration was given 1983 by Peter Kivy (2004: 99-101). If right, 
this theory could avoid the problems of understanding improvisation as a 
                                                                   
10 It would be unfair, however, unfair not to mention that Alperson’s 1984 seminal 
paper gave a big impulse to philosophical investigations on improvisation and that 
Alperson’s research on the topic has since then provided an important benchmark for 
the topic. 
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token of a single type. However, Kivy’s account of improvisation is wrong. 
Unlike Wolterstorff (1975) Kivy thinks that the improvisational action is, 
as such, a kind of composition. It is not necessary that a musical work is 
scored in order to be composed. The improvised performance is the act 
that discovers the MW: it is the first token of the type the MW consists in. 
According to Kivy’s Platonism, the composition is an act of discovery, 
rather than of creation. Hence, improvisation is composition because it 
discovers a MW, while tokening its structure for the first time. Therefore, 
improvisation accomplishes two things at once, according to Kivy. The 
improviser not only composes, but also interprets, the MW. In an 
improvisation such accomplishments – composition and interpretation – 
occur at the same time. Yet they still are different accomplishments. 
While improvising, the musician may, for example, add a bit of rubato, 
that, according to his musical tradition is usually heard as part not of the 
composed work, but of the performance. Hence, in writing a score that 
matches the work composed by improvisation, the transcriber can skip 
the indication of rubato, because this is not part of the conditions for a 
right performance of the work. Yet, is it a correct way, and the only 
possible way, to understand the connection of improvisation and MW? I 
do not think so, and I will now explain why. 
Kivy’s understanding of improvisation as composition and as 
performance of the composition seems to be an effort to solve the 
problem resulting from the odd consequences of the application of the 
type/token distinction, drawn from the ontology of music in general, to 
the ontology of musical improvisation in particular: the transformation of 
Platonism in a kind of ‘nominalistic Platonism’ or ‘platonistic 
Nominalism’. The only way to avoid the awkward multiplication of 
entities generated by conceiving the spatiotemporally individuated 
singular performance p of MW as the token of a MWTS could be reached 
by distinguishing an essential and an accidental part in what is 
accomplished while improvising and by improvising. Essential and 
eternal is the work discovered by the improvisational action. Ephemeral 
and accidental is the interpretational contribution of the improvisational 
action. Unfortunately, this misconceives completely the ontology of 
improvisation, by making it a kind of tool for getting through to the MW, a 
tool that can be, as it were, thrown away after being used. 
According to Kivy, MWs are eternal and unchangeable. Composition 
is a discovery and improvisation is a kind of composition. In this sense 
MWs can be the outcomes of improvisations and under this aspect 
improvisations are valuable undertakings. Improvisers reveal MWs, while 
adding to them elements that are expression of a certain style, a certain 
historical and cultural context, a certain mood, and so on. These elements 
are non-structural and from a 'purist', formalist and Platonist 
perspective, incidental, features of music: duration, phrasing, rhythm, 
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instrumentation, dynamics, expression, articulation, and timbre. Yet, 
through these incidents we can get to the MW. Hence, the Platonist can 
tolerate them as kinds of necessarily evils. 
Unfortunately, this view depends entirely on Kivy’s Platonist musical 
ontology, which does not overcome the objections stated above in §2.1. 
The way the Platonist explains improvisation, by distinguishing in it an 
essential and a contingent part –the part through which we can get to the 
eternal MW, and the ephemeral part that depends on the performance 
conditions and means– reveals a preference for the result of the 
improvisational process: for the product. Yet, even if we grant that the act 
of composition is valuable only in virtue of the composed MW, this is not 
true of improvisation, because in improvisation we have not first the 
process and then the product, but the process is the product. They simply 
cannot be distinguished. 
This has negative consequences on Platonism as a general ontology 
of music. 
As we saw in §2.1.c, Platonism does not account for the fact that the 
criteria of correctness for performances are not part of the nature of 
MWs, but shift according to musical practices. Following this line of 
thoughts, one may argue that the criteria for distinguishing an essential 
and an ephemeral part of improvisation are not embedded in the work’s 
identity that an improvisation, according to Kivy, discovers. Hence, it is 
not clear how to pick out the elements that belong to the MW from the 
elements that belong to interpretations or renditions of the MW. 
Surprisingly this is precisely what even Kivy thinks. For he thinks that, 
whether the rubato played during an improvisation is or not an essential 
part of the work discovered while improvising depends upon musical 
conventions. Hence, he should consequently say, the identity of a MW is 
not of an atemporal metaphysical order. It is a cultural, historical identity, 
with changes through time. Not only that. The very idea that one can 
distinguish between an essential and an ephemeral part of improvisation 
as well as between a MW and its interpretations and renditions is due to a 
particular cultural and historical notion of MW. This notion of MW arises 
within historical musical practices along with conventions about 
performances. Those notions, practices and conventions are hardly 
unchangeable. Yet, if the identity of MW is subject to transformations, 
because musical conventions as well the very notion of MW change, then 
Platonism, which defends that MW are eternal unchangeable type, is 
wrong. 
Musical Platonism does not accommodate the ontology of musical 
improvisation as a real, irreversible, and singular process. Moreover, the 
failure to explain improvisation according to the Platonist type/token 
duality, by saying that improvisations have essential as well as ephemeral 
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parts, show that a general failure of Platonism is to ignore the cultural 
and historical character of MWs. 
4. Werktreue, Fictionalism and Real Music 
The general flaw of formalist ontology, both of the Platonist and 
Nominalist sort, derives from the unwarranted assumption that it is 
metaphysically obvious what it means for the relation between a MW and 
its performances to be explained as a matching between performances 
and MW.11 What is claimed is that the performance must be faithful to the 
MW: it must match it, in order to be performance of MW. According to 
Platonists, this is so because MW is a type: its identity is essential and 
unchangeably transmitted through its occurrences. According to 
Goodman’s Nominalism work identity is preserved by rigidly tying the 
legitimacy of a given performance of MW to the notational elements of 
some score (and, as we saw, this entails odd consequences). Anyway, the 
standards of performance-correctedness are not exclusively established 
by the MW as type (Platonism) or by the score (Nominalism). Goehr 
(1992: 99) wrote in this regard that “most if not all identity conditions for 
works and performances are (...) mis-translations of ideals that exist 
within classical music practice.” In other words, the allegedly 
unchangeable identity of MWs depends on the practices in which the 
notion of MW has been developed. We are able to refer to MWs as entities 
that are instantiable in their tokens without loss of identity or as 
compliance classes of equal performances only in virtue of the cultural 
fictional discourse arising out of the aesthetic practices established in the 
context of Western classical music. 
I term this position Fictionalism, but contrary to Kania (2008a), who 
introduced this terminology in the ontological debate on music, I do not 
think that it is a metaphysical stance. Rather it is a kind of deconstruction 
of the metaphysical demands on music (it could be called also 
(De)constructivism). Accordingly, it would see as ideological dogma the 
idea that MWs are metaphysical entities with unchangeable identities or 
classes of equal performances. The perfect matching between 
performance and MW is not a normative criterion for preserving the 
identity of MWs (as types or classes) through correct performances. It is 
rather an aesthetic and evaluative ideal in the frame of Western classical 
music and its aesthetic theory: the Werktreue ideal. The (conscious or 
unconscious) acceptance of this ideal underlies the belief that MWs have 
an ontological identity, which is separated from their instantiations in 
                                                                   
11 See Ridley’s criticism toward Davies’ account of the relation between work and 
performance (Ridley 2003: 210-11; Davies 2001: 5). 
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performances that should faithfully manifest the intrinsically 
unchangeable MW. 
Ridley (2003) elaborates on this point. According to him, the ideal of 
matching is at most a cultural prescription, which is valid only in certain 
musical practices and should not be universalized. Moreover, Werktreue 
cannot be the criterion for evaluating performances, because, in order to 
do this, we need to determine the identity of MWs independently from 
their performances. Yet this is impossible. The attempt to determine the 
ontological identity conditions for MWs makes necessary the distinction 
between a good and a legitimate performance. This distinction is made 
possible thanks to the already considered distinction between essential 
and accidental elements of MWs. Unfortunately, the distinction between 
essential and accidental elements of MWs depends on evaluations, that 
are made and are understandable only in certain musical practices, not in 
others (cf. Cadenbach 1978: 86). The alleged identity conditions of MWs 
cannot even determine which performances are legitimate, for the MW’s 
properties are specified only by the performances and the ways they are 
evaluated in a musical practice. In this sense musical ontology depends 
on musical and aesthetic practices. But how can one justify the claim that 
ontology depends upon those practices? Here I can only sketch a strategy 
of answer, before returning to improvisation. 
The issue is to explain how ontological intuitions about MWs, their 
identity and their connection with performances depend upon the 
musical practices they are rooted in –that is, according to my Fictionalist 
stance, how they are constructed in and through those practices. A partial 
answer may be provided by considering scores. Writing scores is a 
technical practice that is not merely a way to get access to a pre-existent 
work and a condition for its diffusion. It is also part, in certain historical 
situations, of the production process of the MW, because it “enables a 
work to have a kind of autonomous existence (…)” (Benson 2003: 80). To 
put it in a simply way: the practice of writing music in scores makes 
possible the representation of an unchangeable MW existing 
independently from its performances. We represent MWs as individuated 
unchangeable entities because the scores, in which they are “embedded”, 
are – despite the fact that the can also be modified – “solid” objects that 
can be easily re-identified. 
Some scores specify in a highly detailed way the pitches that must be 
played, the way they should sound and the instruments that must be 
used: the works they notate are, according to Davies (2001), “thicker” 
than other works, which, in comparison, are “thinner”, because they are 
not specified in a detailed way by the instructions embedded in scores. In 
this case the notation is generic or even absent. However, the point is that 
even in case of MWs specified in a highly detailed way by scores, it is 
wrong to say that performances of the MW w are, generally speaking, but 
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mere instantiations of w mirrored in a score, that thus do not affect w’s 
identity. It is wrong to infer w’s ontological consistency and identity as 
well as its independence of any cultural construction from the possibility, 
given by scores, of associating a single MW with several performances (cf. 
Cometti 2008: 174). 
The identity of MWs is not metaphysical: it is the product of the 
cultural discourse of the Werktreue ideal. Yet, even in the practices 
regulated by this discourse the autonomous existence of MWs is only a 
manner of speaking, a fiction, because, even in the case of “thick” MWs – 
say a Brahms’ symphony – “what we hear in performance is always much 
more than can be indicated in the score” (Benson 2003: 80) and this 
“much more” is not the same “much more” in every performance of the 
MW. As Davies (2003: 56) acknowledges, the score of a work undermines 
the sound of its performances, i.e. it does not rigidly determine how it 
must be translated, as it were, in sounds. The score does not explain 
exactly how performers can even recognize – and distinguish between – 
determinative and recommendatory intentions as to how the work should 
be faithfully performed. The correctness criteria for performances are not 
rigidly established by scores and vary due to the musical practice one is 
considering. Also the allowed variation level of those criteria depends on 
the practice. Hence, standards of evaluation for performances change as 
the practice changes as well as if one considers a practices, like jazz, rock 
or pop for instance, that are not based on the Werktreue ideal. This means 
that scores, that shape the representation of the identity of MWs, cannot 
guarantee that this identity is respected in the practice. 
Moreover, to be faithful to the work is hardly intrinsically good and 
valuable. Even if we grant that all author’s intentions can be recognized in 
the score, it does not follow from this that performers must obey to them. 
If they think that it is better to play differently or even different material, 
they can change (what they think it is) the MW. The reason of this could 
be their desire to delight the listeners. This desire can supersede the 
Werktreue ideal, and become another ideal that shapes a different 
musical practice. 
Analogously, only in the Werktreue regime transcriptions of MWs 
must be faithful to the author. The problem is, however, that it is not clear 
what this amounts to. Even in this regime the content of the MW 
(whatever could this mean) is not closed in the score or in a type or in a 
compliance class, waiting to be recognized, performed and transcribed. If 
musical transcriptions are comments on something else they refer to as 
the original by the very fact of presenting themselves as transcriptions of 
it, than transcriptions add new content to a MW and, in so doing, they 
change the MW to different degrees. In this sense every transcription is, 
to different degree, creative. Whether the result of the elaboration on a 
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score is a transcription, an arrangement or a new MW is a matter of 
stipulation, of cultural convention, of aesthetic ideals. 12 
Obviously, one could attack this way of reasoning, by saying that, if 
something can change, than this something is an entity that can be 
identified and, if it can be identified in different situations, it is the same 
thing through its modifications. Unfortunately, this view rests – at least in 
this case – on a mistake. The possibility to identify a MW through a 
cultural discourse, by appealing to scores, authorial intentions, cultural 
ideals, perceptual similarities, and, ultimately, ways of speaking, does not 
grant that, aside from scores, performances and recordings, there really is 
something like an unchangeable MW (cf. Young 2011). 
MWs are ontologically flexible, because they are shaped and 
continuously re-shaped in changing cultural practices. Since the cultural 
practices are continuously changing, the cultural products are changing 
too. What is ontologically an arrangement of the Aria n. 14 from the 
Queen of the Night (“Der Hölle Rache kocht in meinem Herzen”) from 
Mozart’s Die Zauberflöte performed by a brass section of the Berliner 
Philarmoniker?13 Is this performance a performance of (a part of) the 
MW? Is it a right token of the right type? Is it a member of the right class? 
Is it a forgery? An imitation? A parody? A faithful transcription? A 
creative transcription? Both a faithful and a creative transcription? And 
how faithful and/or creative is the transcription? Or…? The answer to this 
question depends on aesthetic ideals and tastes, rather than on 
metaphysical truths. Personally, I think that it is a transcription that offer 
an interpretation, and in this particular case a successful one, of a well 
known MW, performed by the champions of Western classical music, that 
change the fiction (and, to some degree change the practice of classical 
music as well), while inventing new possibilities to deal with it. In other 
words it is a part of the fiction’s life. Its raison d’etre is aesthetic or artistic, 
not metaphysical.14 
Hence, should one, as argued by Cometti (2008: 174), “(...) give up 
(…) the ontology of the object that govern our analyses and valuations”? 
Do we need to get over “the image of object [that] springs from our 
grammar and it is in tune with our familiar tendency to reify”? (Cometti 
2008: 174). Yes and no. No, if speaking about musical objects or works 
(and pieces, tunes and the like) is recognized as a fictionalist discourse, 
                                                                   
12 A very different view of this matter is offered in Davies (2003): 47-59. 
13 I listened to this performance in Berlin on Monday October 31st, 2011. It was 
exhilarating. 
14 The same can be said regarding the pop version sung by Michelle Veenemans (URL: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PcYKHmsuSoc). The very different reported 
listeners’ comments offer aesthetic judgments, not ontological considerations, about 
the piece. 
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which is moderately acceptable and useful in some practices. Yes, if one 
claims that MWs, as metaphysical entites, are real, actual and 
unchangeable objects. Therefore I do not think that “we need an 
aesthetics without ontology”, as argued by Ridley and Cometti (see 
Cometti 2008, p 174).15 Although I agree with their criticism against 
formalistic and objectivistic musical ontologies, I draw a different 
conclusion. We should avoiding throwing out the baby with the bath 
water. We need not reject ontology in order to save the aesthetics. We 
need rather to work out an ontology that fits better to explain the 
aesthetics of music, especially where improvisation is involved. 
Looking at improvisation, from an anti-formalist perspective, assists 
us in this task, because it lets us focus on the constitutive feature of 
music: music is real only as activity and, whatever the way it is 
performed, it exists only when is performed here and now. 
5. Here and Now. Music as Improvisation 
We can hardly play or listen to types or compliance classes. Music is 
something to be played and heard, it is real only in actual performances. 
For this reason, I suggest that we re-orient musical ontology by looking at 
the practice of improvisation. This strategy is not new. It is a strategy 
nowadays performed by philosophers as well by musicologists, arguing 
that “the binary schema of ‘composing’ and ‘performing’ (...) does not 
describe very well what musicians actually do” (Benson 2003: x) and 
what people actually experience. Composition and performance overlap 
in significant ways. 
Benson (2003) thinks that the hegemony of the ideology of Western 
classical music has shaped the philosophy of music until now, leading it to 
reify the practical separation between composition and performance, by 
which one element (composition) is privileged over the other 
(performance) which is considered as “primarily reproductive and only 
secondarily creative” (Benson 2003: 10). Yet, Benson goes on arguing, 
this is reflective only of the way in which a limited part of musical 
activities were organized during a short historical period. Actually most 
performers and composers are in a constant dialogue, to the extent that 
performers contribute to the continuous transformation of musical works 
and pieces. 
Here improvisation comes into play. Improvisation, is, generally 
speaking, music created while being performed. The product the listeners 
hear is the process: music created as it is being performed. Now, 
composing and performing as well as other activities involved in music 
                                                                   
15 For a criticism against Ridley’s position see Kania 2008a. 
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making –arranging, transcribing, interpreting, re-mixing etc.– are 
processes as well, but they are different kinds of processes. In these cases 
the product is (and is perceived as) different from the process. 
Nonetheless, although in them there is no real time coincidence between 
process and product, and despite their difference from improvisation, 
there is a sense in which they are improvisational: in these activities 
decisions are made about the process as the process is going on. 
Consider composition. It can be conceived as the (provisionally) 
frozen outcome of improvisational processes and their emendations. In 
this sense, the process of creation of music is a kind of performance, even 
if there is no audience and even if the music does not actually sound and 
it is only imagined as sounding: the composer is the listener of the (real 
or imagined) music. Hence, if composing is a process of creating music by 
performing, composition can be conceived as improvisational, in this 
limited, yet important sense. 
And now consider performance. In every musical practice, not only do 
performers have more or less free room for improvisation, but this is 
required of them (Benson 2003: 82). It is required that performers, 
before and while performing, make decisions as to what (for example, 
which notes) and how (slowly? And how slowly? Or impetuously? But 
how impetuously?) to play and choose what and how to play. The scope 
of those choices as well as the degree of their freedom and intentionality 
depend for sure on the performers’ individual style, the musical genre, 
and the performance conventions, all of which are not unchangeable fixed 
parameters, but change through the activities that realize them in each 
performing situation. 
Surely, music is not per se improvisation. A lot of musical practices do 
not make use of improvisation as creation of new musical material during 
the performance and do not consider improvisation a fundamental 
musical resource. Nonetheless, in this sense just explained, as Bruno Nettl 
argued (1998: 5), “improvisation is central to music as a whole”, to the 
extent that “the understanding of music at large hinges on understanding 
something of improvisation”. Without denying the differences between 
composing, performing, transcribing etc., and improvisation strictu sensu, 
it seems useful to adopt the concept of improvisation in order to grasp 
the processual character of different kinds of musical operations. 
Improvisation can be considered as a key activity of music, due to its 
“mediation” between composition and performance: like composition it is 
a kind of “putting together” (Benson 2003: 136 and 143; cf. Gould and 
Keaton 2000); like performance it has interpretative character. 
Conversely, performances can be conceived as “improvisations on 
compositions” and compositions not only can be the result of a more or 
less improvisational activity: they also change through the performances 
(and the transcriptions) that enacted them, in ways that they cannot 
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completely determine and that cannot be rigidly planned. A kind of (true 
or presumed) spontaneity seems to be involved in all kind of music as 
activity – that is, as Small (1998) calls it, as musicking. Hence, although 
Benson’s claim that “music making is fundamentally improvisational” 
(Benson 2003: xii) is highly overstated,16 it makes sense to say that 
improvisation is a genuine musical activity that manifests a truth about 
music as such.17 
This truth is that music is sound art that is real only when performed 
and heard in the moment. Musical ontology based on the concept of work, 
as type, compliance class, or concrete objects with different temporal 
parts, seems to underestimate this point. 
Obviously, we can reasonably speak about different kinds of musical 
objects, which have different meanings and values in different contexts: 
harmonic intervals, rhythmical figure, melodic phrases; distorted chords 
played by the guitar, a “do di petto”, a glissando, a riff, a loop, a blue note; 
sonatas, symphonies, stanzas, chorus, songs, tunes, MWs, etc. However, 
these objects, that are constituted, individuated and recognized by our 
cognition as targets of our intention and attention, are real elements of 
music only in the actual process of the performance. They have a social 
and historical, not a metaphysical, dimension. Objects of this kind are not 
at all incompatible with the practice of improvisation and with the notion 
of music as “musicking”. As Arbo (2010: 245) writes: 
 
[…] tout objet musical – du plus générique (comme un motif, une harmonie ou 
une séquence d’accords, etc.) au plus éphémère (la performance d’une jam 
session), au plus spécialisé ou canonisé (les œuvres reconnues en relation avec 
un répertoire, un genre ou un style) – peut être expliqué avec pertinence (…) sous 
la forme (…) d’un acte qui s’accompagne de quelque forme de fixation (graphique, 
notationnelle, mais aussi gestuelle ou simplement mnémonique) qui en assure 
l’identité et la reprise dans un contexte donné. Ce principe s’applique à une 
grande varietè de réalités musicales : même des improvisations ‘libres’ (comme 
celles du guitariste Derek Bailey ou, dans un autre style, du oudiste Anouar 
Brahem), dans la mesure où elles souhaitent conserver l’esprit de créations 
instantanées, se réfèrent à l’inscription de gestes instrumentaux dans un 
répertoire de possibilités – des séquences, des modules harmoniques, des 
gammes, des rythmes, des sonorités, etc. – susceptibles d’être reconnues par un 
auditeur plus ou moins avisé, et qui peuvent faire en ce sens l’objet d’une analyse 
spécifique. 
                                                                   
16 See also Benson’s entry “Phenomenology of music” in Gracyk & Kania (2011): 589-
590. 
17 To speak of improvisation, without qualifications, is inaccurate. There are different 
kinds of improvisation: strict intentional or unavoidable improvisation, improvisation 
as performance, improvisation as practice, the improvisational character of creative 
processes, etc. However, the differences between them are not of primary importance 
here. 
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However, we must not confound the notion of musical object with the 
notion of MW, which is only a kind of musical object in certain musical 
practices and not a metaphysical entity. Indeed, the notion of musical 
object is fully consistent with the idea that what primarily counts for the 
musical experience is not – at least, not always, and not usually – the 
(more or less abstract and unchangeable) MW, but the “material, present 
event” (Abbate 2004: 506), because, I quote Vladimir Jankélévitch (2003: 
70), “a musical work does not exist in itself except in the time of its 
playing (…)”. 
Although music does not reduce itself to improvisation – otherwise 
the concept itself of improvisation would be dilated too much and 
deprived of any specific content –, we hear music here and now, 
composers listen or imagine to listen to the music they are composing as 
they compose, performers must decide on the spot how and what to play. 
Every musical performance, while using and manifesting different kinds 
of musical objects, is an event that is tied to the moment of its occurring.18 
In this sense, while music can be fixed in memories, recordings and 
scores, it is not as fixed, that it moves. It can move, only if actualized; and 
it is actualized only if played. Looking at improvisation can remind us of 
this fact as Platonist and formalist ontologies of music cannot do. Hence, 
improvisation is here taken as a key category for music ontology, because 
exemplifying the processual character of music, as performing activity as 
well as an on-going dialogue between composition and performance, in 
which different musical objects become actually real and actually 
recognizable and valuable as elements of the musical experience in the 
context of different cultural practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
18 I agree with Dieter A. Nanz (2011: 23), improvisation makes us aware of the 
performative character of all kind of music: “Zwischen der Anstrengung der 
Vorbereitung, der technischen und hermeneutischen Aneignung des Werks, und der 
Bühne, zwischen Partitur und Klang, findet jedesmal ein Sprung statt. Was die Musik 
sein wird lässt sich nicht vollständig vorausbestimmen. Immer bleibt ein Teil von ihr 
der Ausführung vorbehalten, wird das Werk eigentlich erst auf der Bühne erfunden, 
nicht immer ist das Resultat mit dem Plan deckungsgleich. Der Interpret nimmt das 
ganze Risiko; wenn er danach strebte, bei jeder Aufführung dasselbe zu realisieren, 
würde er es aussperren und gleichzeitig potenzieren. Was gespielt wird, sei es eine 
Improvisation oder eine Komposition, wurde noch nie gespielt. Es ist ‚Performance’”. 
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